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In sociolinguistics, where identity tends to be our first explanatory resource, Peter
Trudgill’s claim that identity is “irrelevant” as a factor in his area of interest is
particularly striking. There are at least three questions here. The first is Trudg-
ill’s direct concern: whether identity considerations impinged on the develop-
ment of new national colonial varieties. The second is the underlying question of
whether identity, in itself and in general, can stand as a motive for sociolinguis-
tic action and change. The third is whether face-to-face linguistic accommoda-
tion, which Trudgill invokes as the core process through which new dialects come
to be, can and does function in the absence of identity considerations.
I will not comment on the first question, other than to make one obvious point.
Even if we reject the consolidated motive of “wanting to signal a national iden-
tity” as a plausible explanatory factor for new-dialect formation, this does not
rule out other motivational and identity-related considerations from being rele-
vant to the same processes of change. Trudgill’s skepticism – asking how dispa-
rate people could possibly have formed an identity pact to represent themselves
indexically as a community through a new way of speaking – certainly seems
well founded. But to rule out all issues of identity, particularly in circumstances
of demographic movement and cultural mixing, seems unnecessarily restrictive.
In relation to the second question, I would want to agree strongly with Trudg-
ill that there are dangers in running too freely to causal explanations around
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identity. Sociolinguistics has suffered from reductive theorizing around identity,
in simplistic purposive accounts of identity-as-motive (“people use variety x in
order to mark their allegiance to community x”), in much the same way as biol-
ogy has sometimes overinvested in functional explanations (“mammals devel-
oped wings in order to fly”). I would want to go further and argue that it is
inadequate to construe identity as an independent variable that either does or
does not determine language change in particular settings. Trudgill appears to
accept the principle of causal determinism (that identity can cause change) when
he argues vociferously that this isn’t what is happening in the colonial case. But
his argument that identity is likely to be as much a consequence as a cause of
sociolinguistic practice is convincing, and I come back to this shortly.
So what about accommodation and identity? In 1986, when Trudgill theorized
dialect contact and change in terms of interpersonal accommodation, I commented
in a review that this was a valuable rapprochement between variationist sociolin-
guistics and sociopsychological approaches to interaction. It opened a perspec-
tive on human agency and relational processes underlying linguistic change. It
acknowledged that it is people, not merely dialects, that are in contact, and that
interpersonal and intersubjective dimensions of language use are where explana-
tions for change must lie. In the present essay, Trudgill still finds an explanation
for linguistic change in “how individual speakers behave linguistically in face-
to-face interaction,” but, even more than in the 1986 book, he empties out the
human and agentive values of interaction by arguing that interpersonal accom-
modation is automatic and mechanistic, and indeed genetically preprogrammed.
In contrast, since Howard Giles’s first (1973) conceptualization of accommo-
dation theory, human motivations and identities have been among its focal con-
cerns. Meyerhoff 1998, for example, suggests that communication accommodation
theory (CAT) mainly exists to address the interactional nature of identity construc-
tion, and this is closely echoed in other reviews (cf. Coupland & Jaworski 1997).
We might even think that CAT has tended to be over-explicit about the motiva-
tions underlying accommodation and about the identity management strategies that
are entailed. A typical formulation of CAT’s core predictive claims is that people
will converge to each other’s speech characteristics if and when they want to
improve communication effectiveness and0or to boost social attractiveness
(cf. Giles, Coupland & Coupland 1991). This sort of rubric sets up categories of
people and of circumstances where speakers’ motives regarding social relation-
ships vary, and mainly the contrast between people wanting to get on with others
versus people wanting to symbolize their distinctiveness from others. Speakers lin-
guistically “move closer” to their speaking partners if they want closer relation-
ships, and so on. Identity is central to claims like these, for example because
“boosting social attractiveness” means presenting a self that is more attractive to
another person. Identity goals and relational goals are reflexes of the same inter-
subjective processes in social interaction, and Howard Giles developed accommo-
dation theory very much in tandem with his theoretical work on social identity.
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So CAT has certainly not assumed that accommodation (in the sense of mu-
tual linguistic convergence) is automatic and mechanistic. When Trudgill writes
that “accommodation is not only a subconscious but also a deeply automatic
process,” he is challenging the fundamental claims of the model. Accommoda-
tion theory is a model of strategic operations around linguistic and communica-
tive styling, committed to building predictive claims about the links between
identity and relational aspirations0priorities and styles, and then between styles
and social consequences. This is why we can call accommodation theory a “ra-
tional action” model (Coupland 2001:10). It invests social actors with a degree
of control over their linguistic actions, and a degree of awareness and understand-
ing of their probable social outcomes.
This is not to say that CAT hasn’t considered the claim that accommodation is
automatic. At least, there has been consistent recognition that there is a general
“set” to converge – an overall propensity for people to “move closer.” But we
don’t have to interpret this tendency as mere automaticity, whatever that might
mean. Literatures on social interaction have regularly formulated their own ver-
sions of the set to converge, from preference organization in CA (e.g., the pref-
erence for agreement) to Malinowski’s phatic communion (talk in the fulfilment
of a basic sociality) to Bell’s audience design (stylistic adaptation for audi-
ences). Mutuality and convergence in social interaction are – as a very gross
generalization – the default design principle for social encounters, even though
this design is resisted in many particular circumstances, which CAT labels “di-
vergence.” But the very fact that we recognize the social impact of divergence,
of dispreferred interactional moves, and so on, is sufficient to establish that even
predictable and normative convergence is relationally meaningful. When the dis-
tinguished cognitivist Joseph Cappella writes that interactional synchrony meets
the basic survival needs of bonding and comfort, he opens a window onto the
strategic functioning of accommodation. He makes us realize that even when
interactional stances and designs are “pervasive” and “relatively automatic,” they
can nonetheless be designed around social outcomes. The apparent contrast be-
tween “automatic” and “strategic” practice is blurred.
All the same, Trudgill usefully shakes up our assumptions about rational action
models and their handling of identity. There are certainly occasions when people
purposively and rationally target identities for themselves in talk, and when peo-
ple target specific relational outcomes of the sort that CAT deals with. Dialect is a
rich resource for stylistic operations that can work toward these ends (Coupland
2007). But identity is often less coherent, less rationalized, more elusive, more
negotiated, and more emergent than this. Identities are known to be often multi-
ple and contingent. Constructionist epistemology has it this way as a matter of
dogma, although it might be better to distinguish analytically between cases of
greater or lesser rationality, emergence, and so on, on a case-by-case basis. But
we will also need to analyze identity in its multiple dimensions, which we might
summarize as “knowing, feeling, and doing.” The current theoretical vogue is to
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interpret identity as practice – as a form of doing and discursive achievement –
and this is echoed in Trudgill’s comment that identity might be seen as a conse-
quence of accommodation rather than its “driving force.” But we should not ignore
the dimensions of “knowing how to be”0competence, and feeling0affect too. Ben
Rampton, for example, runs with Raymond Williams’s interpretation of class iden-
tity as a structure of feeling. Identity, as Frederick Barth said, is often more a mat-
ter of establishing boundaries – sensing and displaying who we are not, rather
than who we are – and accommodation often works negatively, in the strategy of
“avoiding being different.” And if (as I have argued elsewhere) our selves are
largely relational, then what we hold on to as “our own identities” is not clearly
separable from how we believe others construe us.
These and other complexities mean that the sociolinguistics of identity will
need to be nuanced, to catch the delicacies of interactionally constructed selves
and relationships. And by implication, identity will rarely if ever be irrelevant.
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I shall begin this brief contribution with a small amount of self-justification,
since I appear to have become picked out as one of the “bad guys” in Trudgill’s
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